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PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
Earl Cline, Esq.':'

The subject of this article, "Professional Liability," is very
broad and could include not only malpractice liability, but also
other liabilities of the physician and surgeon. Instead of att~rapt
ing to discuss so broad a field, it will be confined to the subject of
liability for malpractice and tresspass and particularly recent
trends in court decisions relating to the liability of the physician
and surgeon therefor.
Before discussing cases which seem to indicate a possible
trend in the liability of doctors for claimed malpractice, it may be
well to set out generally the basic legal principles heretofore existing in the relationship of physician and patient.
When a patient solicits the services of a physician or surgeon,
and the physician or surgeon takes charge of the case, it has long
been established that he impliedly represents that he possesses and
will exercise the reasonable or average degree of learning and
skill which is ordinarily possessed and exercised by physicians or
surgeons of ordinary and average learning. In addition, if the
physician or surgeon holds himself out as having special knowledge and skill in treatment or in the performance of special kinds
of surgery, he is bound to exercise not merely the degree of skill
possessed by general practitioners, but that special degree of
skill and knowledge possessed by those who are specialists in the
treatment of such ailments.
The courts are not entirely in accord in setting up the standard for determining whether the physician or surgeon has exercised the proper degree of care or skill. Some courts have restricted it to the same locality or vicinity. Other courts have
tested his care and skill by that exercised by the same class of
practitioners in similar localities. With the general dissemination
of medical knowledge, with the publication of medical periodicals
and with the meeting of medical associations, it has come to be
recognized that the standard of care and skill is almost universal.
As the Virginia Court expressed it: "He ... [the physician] impliedly represents that he is keeping abreast of the literature and
that he has adopted those techniques which have become standard
in his line of practice."1
*l\:Iember, Nebraska Bar Association and American Bar Association.
From an address delivered at American Medical Association Legal Symposium, Omaha, Nebraska.
1 Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 293, 8 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1940).
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The rule has long been recognized that if a physician or
surgeon employs ordinary skill and care in arriving at his diagnosis, he will not be liable in damages, even though the treatment
is not proper for the condition that actually exists. The Nebraska
Court supported this rule in Van Boskirk v. Pinto.2
Likewise, the law recognized that there are different schools
of medicine and the treatment of the physician or surgeon is to
be tested by the principles and practices of his particular school.
If he follows the accepted practice of his school, he will not be
guilty of negligence. But this does not necessarily exclude the
testimony of physicians or surgeons of other schools, if it can be
shown that the principles of the two schools concur. This provision has led to some difficulties, such as osteopaths testifying
that their training and practices are the same as allopaths, thereby qualifying themselves to testify against a physician or surgeon
of the regular school of medicine.
Universally, it has been held that where a physician is employed to attend a patient, the relation continues until it is ended
by consent of the parties, or revoked by the dismissal of the physician, or until the services are no longer needed. The physician
is required to use reasonable care to determine when to discontinue his treatment, and when he terminates his employment without notice to the patient and without affording the patient an
ample opportunity to secure other medical attendance, he abandons
the patient and may be liable in damages.3 In other words, a
physician or surgeon takes a patient for the "duration of the war,"
and while he can be discharged, he cannot discharge the patient.
Generally, also, the rule has been that a physician or surgeon
may be liable for the malpractice of his partner, or for injury
resulting from the negligence of assistants, agents or servants
employed by him. But he is not legally liable for the negligence
of nurses or interns or employees of a hospital, unless the hospital
is owned or controlled by him. 4
In connection with the performance of operations, it has been
generally accepted that a surgeon performing an operation in an
emergency, or with the consent of the patient or those authorized
to act for him, or under circumstances whereby the consent of
the patient is presumed or implied, is not liable in damages if he
exercises ordinary care and skill. Voluntary submission to an
99 Neb. 164, 155 N.W. 889 (1915).
s Stohlman v. Davis, 117 Neb. 178, 220 N.W. 247 (1928).
4 Broz v. Omaha Maternity & General Hospital .Ass'n, 96 Neb. 648,
148 N.W. 575 (1914).
2
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operation has always implied consent. But, an operation performed without the consent of the patient constitutes an assault
for which damages may be recovered.6
In a malpractice suit against a physician or surgeon, the
elaimant must prove:
1. That the relation of patient and physician or surgeon
existed. This relation may exist gratuitously and there is no
distinction between "free" patients and "pay" patients. If the
relationship is established, the physician or surgeon impliedly warrants that he is qualified.

2. The claimant must establish his case by a preponderance
of the evidence, and must show that the physician or surgeon
departed from his duty in some respect.
3. The claimant must prove that his damage proximately
resulted from the negligent acts of commission or omission of the
physician or surgeon.6 Generally, it is believed that suits against
physicians or surgeons are difficult, because the doctors stand
together, that, like husband and wife, they fight among themselves, but when anyone attacks either of them, they join against
the adversary. The converse is true. In a malpractice case, all
that a claimant needs to do to prove proximate cause is to establish, by competent evidence, that any one act of the physician or
surgeon, over possibly a long course of treatment, resulted in the
damage.
Previously, it has always been recognized that the claimant
must establish actual negligence; that a bad result is not evidence
of negligence. To establish failure to use proper treatment on
the part of a physician or surgeon, expert evidence of other physicians or surgeons would be required. Long ago, Mr. Chief Justice
Taft, while Federal Circuit Judge, laid down this rule in Ewing
v. Goode,7 which became an established landmark. In that case
it was claimed that there was malpractice in removing a cataract
from the plaintiff's eye. Judge Taft said:
If the maxim, "Res ipsa loquitur." were applicable to a case

like this, and a failure to cure were held to be evidence, however
slight, of negligence on the part of the physician or surgeon
causing the bad result, few would be courageous enough to practice the healing art, for they would have to assume financial liability for nearly all the "ills that flesh is heir to" . . . . [I]t is
5 See

Annot., 129 A.L.R. 1370 (1942).
GWinters v. Rance, 125 Neb. 577, 251 N.W. 167 (1933).
7 78 Fed. 442 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1897).
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not enough to show the injury, together with expert opinion that
it might have occurred from negligence and many other causes.

Such evidence has no tendency to show that negligence did cause
the injury. When a plaintiff produces evidence that is consis_tent with an hypothesis that the defendant is not negligent,
and also with one that he is, his proof tends to establish neither.s
(Emphasis added.)

The Nebraska Supreme Court approved this rule in Tady v.

Warta. 9
The foregoing, while not constituting all the established principles governing the relationship between physicians and surgeons
and patients, have long been recognized as the settled rules of the
relationship. Physicians and surgeons have come to know them
and have governed themselves accordingly. Insurance policies
have been written with the view of affording protection to physicians and surgeons under circumstances such as might arise under
such established legal principles.
In the last twenty years, malpractice suits, over the country
generally, have been rather numerous. There appear to be some
departures from some of these established principles.. Here are
some illustrations:
In a Pennsylvania case, it would seem that a new landmark
was established.10 This case had to do with the question of agency.
The plaintiffs consulted the defendant, who was an obstetrician,
to attend the wife during pregnancy and to deliver the child.
The doctor accepted the employment. A Caesarean operation was
necessary. The doctor directed that a certain intern should be
his assistant and take care of the baby after delivery. Upon delivery of the child, it was turned over to the intern. The plaintiffs claimed that silver nitrate solution negligently administered
by the intern destroyed one eye and permanently damaged the
other. The trial court directed a verdict for the doctor, but it
was reversed on appeal.
The plaintiffs did not claim that the doctor was personally
s Id. at 443-44. In a headnote to the decision, the requirement for the
use of expert testimony was pointed out explicitly. The headnote stated:
Upon questions involving a highly specialized art, with
respect to which a layman can have no knowledge at all, the court
and jury must be dependent upon expert evidence; and, when
there is no such evidence to support an allegation depending upon
such a question, there is nothing to justify submitting the issue
to the jury.
9111 Neb. 521, 196 N.W. 901 (1924).
10 McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949).
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guilty of negligence. The question was whether the doctor could
be held, under the doctrine of respondent superior, for the negligence of the intern, an employee of the hospital. This question
was held to be one for the jury. The doctor had admitted, under
cross-examination, that all of the persons in the operating room
were subject to his control or right of control with regard to the
manner in which they performed their duties. The Pennsylvania
court said:
In determining whether the intern was defendant's servant at
that time, the mere fact that he was then in the general employ
of the hospital would not prevent the jury from finding that he
was also at that same time the servant of defendant if he was
then subject to his orders in respect to the treatment of the
child's eyes with the silver nitrate solution.11

Two subsequent Pennsylvania cases have only somewhat limited
the effect of the rule laid down in the McConnell case. 12 The
inherent dangers of this kind of a situation remain apparent.
Recalling the decision of Judge Taft in Ewing v. Goode, which
established the general rule that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is not applicable in malpractice cases, attention is now directed
to some exceptions to that rule. Through the years, there have
been some departures, such as in the case of x-ray burns, where
the machine is entirely under control of the physician or a techmcian. In a California case, plaintiff was being operated upon
for appendicitis. He came out of the operation, so he claimed,
with an injury to his right shoulder and an apparent paralysis of
the right arm. The plaintiff's medical experts and an independent
expert appointed by the court, all testified that in their opinion
the injury was traumatic. Defendant's experts were of the opinion that the condition was a systemic product of some infection.
All of the doctors and nurses present at the operation gave evidence that nothing occurred during the operation which could
possibly produce the injury. In fact, nothing occuned at all, except the operation. The court held that as it appeared that an
injury to a healthy part of the body had been incurred during the
operation the facts were sufficient to make a prima facie case
Id. at 366, 65 A.2d at 248.
Sacchi v. Montgomery, 365 Pa. 377, 75 A.2d 535 (1950). stated in
dictum that negligent post operative care of an intern and nurse would
not be imputed to the surgeon. Shull v. Schwartz, 374 Pa. 554, 73 A.2d
402 (1950) hel:d a surgeon was not liable for the failure of an intern
to remove two stitches from an incision following an operation where
the intern had been directed to remove the stitches by the surgeon.
11

12

552

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

against the defendants, under the rule of res ipsa loquitur.13 Upon ,
a second appeal of the case, a judgment for the plaintiff was
affirmed.14
In a subsequent California case, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur was applied where the physician intended to remove a
wart from the plaintiff's nose. The doctor testified that he
planned to remove the wart first, and that for this part of the
operation the plaintiff was given an anesthetic with nitrous oxide
and O};.-ygen. He then intended to remove the tonsils, after giving
the plaintiff an ether anesthetic. Containers of both gases were
in the operating room. The doctor testified that he removed the
wart with an electric needle which gets rather hot and that after he
had finished removing the wart and was cauterizing the wound
with the electric needle, there was a "flash" and a "pop" about
six inches above the plaintiff's face. As a result of this accident,
the plaintiff suffered contusions and bled profusely from the nose
and mouth. The jury in the trial court returned a verdict for the
defendants, but on appeal it was held that plaintiff was entitled
to a new trial. The reason for the reversal was that there were
four possible explanations for the explosion and the defendants
had produced evidence as to their due care on only two of these
possible explanations. The court said that as the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur applied, the defendants had not produced evidence
on all points necessary to enable a jury to find in their favor. 15
The effect of departures from the rule that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur does not apply is to permit a bad result or an
unusual happening to require a physician or surgeon to explain
the cause. In other words, a prima facie case may be established
for the claimant and the burden of proof shifted to the physician
or surgeon.
It has been pointed out previously that the general rule has
been that a physician is not liable for a mistake in judgment in
making a diagnosis where he uses ordinary and reasonable care
and skill, even though his diagnosis, honestly made, may be
wrong. Both Nebraska and Georgia have stated that malpractice
may consist in a lack of skill or care in diagnosis as well as in

13 Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258
(1944). 25 B.U.L. Rev. 25 (1945); 33 Calif. L. Rev. 331 (1945); 40 Ill.
L. Rev. 421 (1946); 18 So. Calif. L. Rev. 310 (1945); 9 U. Det. L.J. 51
(1945).
H Ybarra v. Spangard, 19 Cal. App.2d 43, 208 P.2d 445 (1949).
ltiDierman v. Providence Hospital, 31 Cal.2d 290, 188 P.2d 12 (1947).
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treatment.16 In the Georgia case, it was held that the jury could
find that the defendant optometrist had not exercised reasonable
care and skill in his examination where it appeared from the
evidence that as a result of wearing the glasses prescribed the
patient suffered headaches and nausea and was backward in his
school w0rk. The only expert testimony for the plaintiff was
given by an ophthalmalogist, not an optometrist.17
In a Massachusetts case, the physician, it was claimed, negligently diagnosed the diseased condition as a throat ailment and
ordered the patient taken to a hospital sixty miles away. It was
claimed that the patient was, at the time, suffering with pneumonia. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support
a finding that the defendant should have known that the intestate
was suffering from pneumonia, even if the throat ailment from
which he was also suffering, displayed some symptoms that were
characteristic of pneumonia.18
In an Ohio case, the physician incorrectly diagnosed a patient's pregnancy as gall bladder trouble and treated the patient
for that ailment. The court held that the question as to whether
the physician had used due care and diligence in making the
diagnosis was one of fact for the jury where there is more than
a scintilla of evidence tending to indicate the absence of such
care and diligence. The court further held that as the physician
knew that other medical men had diagnosed the symptons differently there was a scintilla of evidence to support the jury's
verdjct.10
In a United States Court of Appeals case, a patient sustained
a fractured skull and was unconscious for several days. The
physicians treated the patient for the fractured skull but failed
to discover a fractured hip. It was held that the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case of negligence, which put the burden
upon the physicians of proving that the condition of the plantiff's
head was such that examination and treatment of the hip would
have endangered her life.20
In another class of cases, those dealing with consent to surgery, the Nebraska Supreme Court has defined a restriction of
the consent doctrine in cases where the surgeon relies upon the
16 See l\Iangiamel v . .Ariano, 126 Neb. 629, 253 N.W. 871 (1934); Cook
v. Moats, 121 Neb. 769, 238 N.W. 529, 79 A.L.R. 694 (1931).
17Kahn v. Shaw, 65 Ga. 563, 16 S.E.2d 99 (1941).
1s Coburn v. Moore. 320 Mass. 116, 68 N.E.2d 5 (1946).
19 Paulson v. Stocker, 53 Ohio .App. 229, 4 N.E.2d 609 (1935).
2oweintraub v. Rosen, 93 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1937).
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diagnosis of another physician.21 In this case, a physician sent
the patient to a surgeon with a diagnosis of a pelvic tumor. The
surgeon operated, found no tumor, made a diagnosis of pregnancy,
and in connection with the operation, removed the plaintiff's appendix. The court said:
Where, under the above conditions of employment, the surgeon, relying wholly upon the physician's diagnosis, operates, and
during the course thereof discovers facts or conditions which suggest a reasonable basis for a different conclusion from that arrived at by the physician which, if true, would make the proposed
operation inadvisable or unnecessary, and there exists no emergency requiring him to proceed, the surgeon is not negligent if
he refrains from completing the operation until a further proper
diagnosis based upon the newly discovered facts or condition is
made, and a proper course of action ba:sed thereon is determined.
Likewise, where, under the above conditions of employment,
and before performing the operation, the surgeon discovers facts
or conditions which appear to contradict the physican's diagnosis,
or which cause the surgeon to question the correctness of the
physician's diagnosis or to reach a different diagnosis, with the
result that a different or no operative treatment is indicated, and
there is no emergency, and the surgeon operates without making
an additional and proper diagnosis to determine the questions
presented and the action to be taken, the surgeon is negligent
and liable to respond in damages for such injury and detriment
to the patient as proximately follows.22

The members of the medical profession may find the following suggestions helpful.
1. Do not guarantee results or a cure, as a suit could then
be grounded on a breach of an express contract and not upon an
implied contract. In such a case, expert medical testimony, in
all probability, would not be required to be produced by the plaintiff.

2. Be careful in diagnosis, irrespective of whether the patient is a pay or a charity patient, and if the case is one where
the services of a specialist should be secured, then the specialist
should be called in for consultation or the patient referred to the
specialist.
3. Keep abreast of the great progress being made in medicine, for today the physician and surgeon are most likely to be
charged with knowledge of such progress. The North Dakota
court expressed it in these words :
21
22

In re Johnson's Estate, 145 Neb. 333, 16 N.W.2d 504 (1944).
Id. at 344, 16 N.W.2d at 511.
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The duty of a doctor to his patient is measured by conditions as
they exist, and not by what they have been in the past or may be
in the future. Today, with the rapid methods of transportation
and easy means of communication, the horizons have been widened, and the duty of a doctor is not fulfilled merely by utilizing
the means at hand in the particular village where he is practicing.
So far as medical treatment is concerned, the borde-rs of the
locality and community have, in effect, been extended so as to
include those centers readily accessible where appropriate treatment may be had which the local physician, because of limited
facilities or training, is unable to give.23

23Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 344, 294 N.W. 183, 188 (1940).
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